On June 2, 2021, the Eastern Europe Studies Centre organized a discussion to cover the June 14 Brussels NATO summit meeting and potential trajectories of the Alliance’s development, which currently ongoing review processes could lead to. The event featured representatives of the academic community and state institutions who work with or maintain an interest in the topic of transatlantic security. This event was organised as part of a NATO Public Diplomacy Division, seeking to promote persistent discussions between security practitioners at various levels, offering a Lithuanian perspective on ongoing security topics.

NATO and Lithuania

With the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) upgrading Lithuania’s economic forecast with just a few weeks left to the NATO summit meeting, the risk emerged that the country could enter the meeting with an officially reported sub-2% defence spending. Thanks to prompt decision making, the budget was adjusted for the ongoing year, shifting an extra 20.3 million euro to defence, thus allowing Lithuania to avoid a situation, which, all participating experts agreed, would have been a particularly bad situation. Being a part of the “2% club” sends a message about Lithuania’s firm commitment and is crucial in seeking a greater allied presence in the region. It was noted that this is not the first time such a situation occurs and systemic decisions are needed to help avoid the risk of balancing at around the 2% threshold in the future.

As it implements the Wales and Warsaw summit meetings’ commitments, the Alliance has fundamentally reinforced its attention to collective security. This period was notable for several key changes for Lithuania – increased attention to the region’s security, the German-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battalion, a rotational US battalion, renewed defence plans and other factors, which have significantly increased deterrence and defence capacities.

However, the launched NATO 2030 agenda is filled with numerous new topics, which make it difficult to not lose track of NATO’s core mission – collective security. The discussion’s participants agreed that the Alliance’s current financing, planning and capacities are not fully sufficient in the face of the existing threats and so, despite efforts to include new topics into the NATO agenda (topics such as new technologies, combatting climate change, global partnerships and others), the aim must be to ensure that deterrence and defence would remain central. The greater retention of attention in regards to collective defence questions was achieved thanks to the countries most directly faced with the Russian threat and talking in a single voice is particularly important in the context of the events in Belarus and its growing dependence on Russia.

NATO’s development

With the conclusion of the term of US President Donald Trump, a relaxation is setting in among some member states in regards to financing. It is observed that the 2% defence financing threshold has been marked by a “smell” of Trump, which many find unpleasant. The Americans will continue to seek firmer financial commitments from their allies, but an effort will be made to be more subtle about it, seeking compromises. One such proposed method is an increased in overall NATO financing, but a sceptical perspective prevailed in the discussion in this respect – the proposed increase to the general budget could become a basis for slow-downs in national defence budget increases and also, the general budget might finance not just collective defence costs but also numerous other domains.

In terms of the concept of European strategic autonomy, the participating experts reminded that despite the current form of this idea appearing unacceptable to many, the USA has essentially always encouraged Europe to take on a greater role in ensuring its own military security. However, the US-supported strategic autonomy is tied to the enhancement of actual military capacities (more armament, equipment and financing) and not expanding the number of headquarters and the creation of overlapping leadership units. This is exactly why, while seeking to make Europe become more autonomous, the USA views the currently actualised idea of European strategic autonomy with caution.

Despite near unanimous agreement that NATO will have to adapt to new types of threat when the distinction between war and peace is blurred, the significance of this to NATO’s futures led to discussions and numerous divergences of opinion. All participants emphasised the importance of collective security and military capacities, but there is much disagreement on the extent to which NATO should play a role and the powers it should have in combatting hybrid threats or reinforcing member state resilience. Some experts emphasised adherence to NATO’s core role of deterrence and defence, proposing that the problems linked to emerging challenges should be on the agenda of the European Union and other like-minded organisations or should remain the prerogative of nation states.

This more sceptical perspective can be illustrated through one participant’s observation that the Alliance’s agenda is limited in terms of everyday work and it can only focus its attention on 2-3 topics. Hybrid, climate change and other similar threats are not existential ones and so, if the NATO agenda continues to expand its spectrum of topics, this will mean reduced attention to core threats, problems and tasks. An example of such thematical expansion was presented in the form of talks about the potential creation of a climate change centre of excellence, which, many participants believed, would overlap in its function with m any other centres of excellence, including the Energy Security Centre of Excellence.

The discussion participants were rather reserved in terms of climate change gaining prominence in the NATO agenda. The participants were concerned that excessive focus in reducing climate footprints could clash with the defence sector, which could be seen as overly polluting and this could threaten the Alliance’s combat readiness. For example, the talks in the EU about banning the development of internal combustion engines are concerning, given how this could potentially impact the development of military hardware in Europe.

Despite this, there is recognition that climate change will inevitably impact the security environment and operational conditions. One of the participating experts also assured that despite the ongoing political discourse, the military communities of NATO states are very cognizant that at least for the near future, we will not yet have adequate technologies for full electrification of combat vehicles, which could be pursued so as to make the military sector “greener.” The UK has launched the development of a hybrid powered IFV and the Italian and French armed forces have energy security units in their ranks, which engage in experimental activities and research in a bid to increase the use of renewables in the military sector. However, fossil fuels will remain essential for some time yet.

In summary, it was agreed that at the moment, the topics particularly found on the political agendas of the Alliance’s main member states are unlikely to insert themselves into the Alliance’s agenda. Thus, it is necessary to seek ways in this context of pursuing the core goal of retaining NATO’s attention to deterrence and defence, as well as the NATO eastern flank. At the same time, it is necessary to search for what each of the “new” topics on the Alliance’s agenda could benefit NATO’s main mission of collective defence, with the aim of turning these topics in a way that benefits the mission. For example, state resilience was described as “the first line of defence”, with increasing it being important for all of the Alliance’s members and an increased role for NATO in this area could potentially contribute to enhanced collective defence.

Third countries and NATO

The discussion also covered China and Russia, as well as counties seeking NATO membership, with a particular focus on Ukraine in the latter case.

The experts’ opinions diverged on what place China should take on NATO’s agenda. One expert noted that it is unpleasant how the China discourse is beginning to dominate in NATO discussions. The argument goes that, after all, we are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and so, it is risky to run one’s sights so far from the fundamental threat of our region – Russia. Nevertheless, this perspective faced numerous counter-arguments.

Firstly, China should be viewed as an existential threat to the West in general, given that its geopolitical thinking is directed toward recreating the international security structure based on new rules that match its own thinking. Secondly, China is expanding its field of interest into the Arctic where it will encounter the interests of more than one NATO member state. Finally and perhaps most importantly – the less China there will be in the NATO agenda, the less there will be of the USA, the organisation’s core member, in NATO and thus also in Europe. In general, it was agreed that the presence of China in the NATO agenda does not necessarily reduce or push out attention to Russia because often the case is that when discussing one of the two countries, the other one becomes relevant as well. By talking about the threat posed by authoritarian states, we will ensure that issues related to Russia will always be discussed alongside those posed by China.

In terms of Russia, one of the experts pointed out a key change in Russia’s behaviour towards NATO. Previously, according to the participant, Russia took little interest in what went on within NATO, but as of late, it has been responding to internal discussions within NATO and the EU, exploiting them for its own purposes. It is important to observe the signals Russia broadcasts after NATO summits and meetings between the US and Russian heads of state. No less important is to observe signals from the USA, especially given Washington’s decisions related to the Nord Stream II pipeline.

A number of the discussion’s participants voiced concerns over the circumstances for Ukraine’s bid to draw closer to NATO membership. It was noted that while not long ago, there were discussions of granting a membership action plan to Ukraine, the country’s leaders weren’t even invited to the Brussels summit and sanctions on Nord Stream II were lifted at a dubious moment.

One of the participants stated that while we must keep the door open for Ukraine, it is unlikely the country will be able to join the Alliance so long as fundamental changes don’t occur in Russia itself. On the other hand, one of the participants offered a question for consideration – given that Ukraine was not invited to the summit meeting and the changes related to Nord Stream II, perhaps Russia does have an informal veto right in regards to Ukraine’s NATO membership? If so, under what conditions? Despite this, another expert emphasised that we can recall with optimism that the Baltic States’ NATO membership was also viewed as impossible, but our resolute pursuit of this goal helped overcome massive scepticism and so, we must maintain the principle stance of supporting Ukraine’s NATO bid.

In conclusion, it was agreed that more active steps are needed in terms of the future of NATO. On the one hand, the Wales and Warsaw summits led to decisions, which greatly improved Lithuania’s security situation, but on the other – the decisions aren’t yet fully implemented and the emergence of new questions on the NATO agenda could divert attention from the fundamental issues of deterrence and defence. The decision of the Brussels summit meeting to review the NATO Strategic Concept demands active engagement in this context – Lithuania must formulate a clear aim of acting together with like-minded states and ensure that one of the core documents of the Alliance would include an outlook that would prove helpful for it.

Another discussion regarding this topic was presented by an arriving delegation of senior experts and officials from the USA, the Eastern Europe Studies Centre organised a discussion between Lithuanian experts and the American guests, looking at particularly the US’ role and perspective on the global security structure, Lithuania’s outlook and also current events in the security domain. This was the second event organised as part of a NATO Public Diplomacy Division project.

What conclusions should Europe draw from the Afghanistan withdrawal?

The US’ chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan proved disconcerting for America’s allies both within NATO and beyond. It prompted considerations whether a similar scenario could happen to any US partner or even Ally because of shifting US priorities. Even such considerations are shaking the credibility the country holds. From the American perspective, the response focused on an immediate difference between a situation as was the case with Afghanistan and a case where formal allies are involved. Moreover, the US argues that there is far too much hyperventilating over the occurrence, something that’s fanned by China and Russia. The argument is made that the US cannot and will not continue fighting a counter-insurgency for a corrupt and inefficient regime. That said, even with contemporary challenges in mind, the core argument stands that the USA remains fully committed to the collective defence obligations of its Allies.

Allies should perceive Afghanistan as a strategic necessity and an ongoing multi-year shift when it comes to great power competition. The way the withdrawal proceeded might be seen as a debacle, but it is a learning opportunity for the coordination of multilateral efforts. Also, when it comes down to it, this draw-down is a potential positive shift for European security as the US can now divert some of its attention toward Europe as well, even as it shifts its gaze toward China. Admittedly though, this might not manifest in a significantly increased US or perhaps even NATO presence in the Baltics despite the allies in the region pursuing this.

Secondly, even as this shakes trust towards the US, this is not the first time such challenges to its credibility have occurred and the country has been able to re-establish itself in that respect. In fact, the opposite comes into question –the credibility of major US allies such as the UK, Germany, France or Italy? Looking from the American viewpoint, its allies sometimes demonstrate a mismatch in terms of their ambitions versus their capabilities and willpower to follow up on these ambitions. Therefore, the conclusions based on the Afghanistan withdrawal should not be based on immediate emotions.

Both sides of the political aisle in the US view European strategic autonomy in the sense of increased capacities as being a positive element. While there is a recognition of frictions and disconnects at the top political level, the core message from the US is that lower-level cooperation both in terms of the tactical and the strategic remains constant and positive, with some of French President Emanuel Macron’s inflammatory statements being described as just being political bluster.

Lithuania is careful with the sound initiatives as it is also concerned over European capabilities versus ambitions. The worry is that there are thoughts of attempting to balance between the US and China, which risks undermining the existing, if battered, transatlantic connection. Lithuania is strongly promoting the idea that NATO must remain the backbone of the European defence architecture and a strong transatlantic link is crucial to deal with emerging future challenges.

Developments on the Eastern flank

The Biden administration is described as having no illusions regarding the threat Russia poses to the West. Also, it has an understanding that it needs its allies more than ever when it comes to confronting Russia, with a need to rely on a unified vision and a common pool of strength.

That said, the perception of the situation in Belarus is not as intense. The perspective is that Russia does not actually face an existential crisis in Belarus, especially given how the developments there have stalled. Instead, there is a belief that the Kremlin aims to maintain a frozen conflict in Ukraine for as low a price as possible and for as long as possible, with Russia only responding if the separatist forces are truly threatened. As for Belarus, it is not in Russia’s interest to expand its nearby conflicts even further, if for no other reason than the costs involved, which is seen in the US as being reasoning for Russia not taking steps that could destabilise Belarus further. In terms of the US outlook on Belarus, there is no appetite to engage in regime change.

From a purely realistic perspective, the US is simply not willing to fight for the independence of Belarus – the current status quo, while terrible, is less chaotic, less dangerous and less costly than a potential escalation. Nevertheless, less intensive actions such as supporting the Belarusian people’s aspirations against the authoritarian regime, as well as planning for various Belarus-related contingencies, are within the scope of what Washington intends.

From the Lithuanian viewpoint, the current focus is predominantly on Belarus, given the ongoing migrant crisis and generally soured relations following the anti-Lukashenko currents in Belarusian society and Lithuania’s keen support for Belarus’ opposition throughout. This does not, however, remove Russia from the equation, given how much of what is happening in and being done by Belarus is seen as at least partially controlled or guided by Russia, with Belarus seemingly being exploited as a testbed for various new approaches that Moscow could take. The migrant crisis and the hijacking of an aeroplane carrying opposition activist Roman Protasevich seemingly being elements the Kremlin might look to incorporate into its playbook going forward.

Alexander Lukashenko finds himself in a precarious situation at this point. The only currency he has to deal with his sole ally – Russia – is Belarus’ level of autonomy. This puts him in a difficult situation because, while he is now far more pliable for Russia to deal with, his continued leadership is toxic in terms of Russia retaining a grip on Belarus and retaining favourable impressions among the Belarusian people. Indeed, Russia might find it far more useful to push for a pro-Russian replacement, pacifying both the Belarusian public (by way of Lukashenko’s removal) and the West (by feigning democratic change or implementing a neutered version of it).

In the end, there is currently little in the way of optimism regarding future changes in Belarus. The representatives of the regime and the repressive structures that serve them know there could be a reckoning if change sweeps into the country and this would mean they will stand with the regime to the last. At the same time, from the Lithuanian perspective, the idea that a status quo would be tolerable is rejected. Now that the Belarusian people have awoken, they will not fall asleep again as easily and it is the responsibility of the democratic West to stand with them wherever possible. At this juncture, continuing to pressure the regime, especially through non-recognition of the Lukashenko regime’s legitimacy, can continue pressuring both official Minsk and its overlords in the Kremlin.